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ABSTRACT

Technological innovation is a long-recognized catalyst for
economic growth in the United States, and its promotion is an
important feature of national economic policy, as evidenced by the
presence of various tax incentives for innovation in the US Internal
Revenue Code. Tax incentives are an important means by which
governments can deliver subsidies to promote such innovation. To be
effective, however, any system of tax incentives must be tailored for
current economic conditions and competitive landscapes. In the
current ecosystem of innovation in the United States, this means that,
at the very least, the incentives for innovation in the US Internal
Revenue Code should narrowly deliver benefits to entities that create,
transfer, and productively use intellectual property (IP). Moreover,
there should be no opportunities for nonpracticing entities to
misappropriatesuch benefits. But there currently are. This Article
surveys the current regime of tax incentives for technological
innovation and other areas of the US Internal Revenue Code affecting
the economic choices of entities involved in the creation and
dissemination of technological IP. It illustrates instances within the
US Internal Revenue Code and its regulations where distinguishing
between the "good"guys (operating companies and IP intermediaries)
and the "bad" guys (nonpracticing entities) would better tailor the
incentives therein to promote innovation in the modern IP ecosystem.
Joshua Chao is a technology and legal consultant in New York who specializes in issues
related to Internet technology and innovation. He holds a J.D. from Northwestern University
School of Law and a Master's degree in Information Management from the UC Berkeley School
of Information. His professional background includes product management and engineering in
Silicon Valley.
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CONCLUSION

Technological innovation is a long-recognized catalyst for
economic growth in the United States, and its promotion has been an
important feature of US economic policy since the founding of the
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nation.' Through one initiative or another, the US government has
always sought to promote innovation by implementing systems of
incentives for investment in intellectual property (IP). In 1954,
Congress began incorporating incentives for technological innovation
into the Internal Revenue Code (Code) by adding special incentives for
research and development (R&D).2
Although commentators generally recognize tax incentives as
an important means by which governments can deliver subsidies to
promote particular economic activities, 3 to be effective, Congress must
tailor any system of tax incentives to work in alignment with current
economic conditions. 4 The current system of tax incentives intended
to promote innovation is an example of where such an alignment can
be improved.
This Article examines the current regime of tax incentives for
technological innovation as well as other areas of the Code affecting
the economic choices of actors involved in the creation and
dissemination of technological IP.
Part I surveys the current
ecosystem of innovation, with particular emphasis on the growing role
of IP intermediaries.
Part II explores potential statutory
classifications for distinguishing between "good" and "bad" actors in
this ecosystem. And Part III illustrates instances where the addition
1.
See, e.g., United States v. Line Materials Co., 333 U.S. 287, 332 (1948). The
Supreme Court explained:
As interpreter of the Congressional Acts that have expressed the patent policy of this
nation since its beginning, this Court is entrusted with the protection of that policy
against intrusions upon it. The crucial importance of the development of inventions
and discoveries is not limited to this nation. As the population of the world has
increased, its geographical frontiers have shrunk. However, the frontiers of science
have expanded until civilization now depends largely upon discoveries on those
frontiers to meet the infinite needs of the future. The United States, thus far, has
taken a leading part in making those discoveries and in putting them to use.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries"); Benjamin Coriat & Fabienne Orsi, Establishing a New Intellectual
Property Rights Regime in the United States: Origins, Content and Problems, 31 RES. POLY 1491,
1493-95 (2002) (discussing congressional activity in the 1980s aimed at increasing US
competiveness in innovation industries); Lawrence M. Rausch, High-Tech Industries Drive
Global Economic Activity, NAT'L SCI. FOUND. Div. OF Sci. RES. STUDIES (July 20, 1998),
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/issuebrf/sib98319.htm.
2.
See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, The History of Intellectual Property
Taxation: PromotingInnovation and Other Intellectual Property Goals?, 64 SMU L. REV. 795, 831
n.194 (2011) (explaining that § 174(a) was added in 1954, "allowing taxpayers to treat research
or experimental expenditures as expenses not chargeable to capital accounts as long as those
expenditures are paid or incurred in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business").
3.
See Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax
Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 974-77 (1986) (arguing that tax incentives, although not part of
a normative income tax, are nevertheless economically efficient).
4.
See id. at 1033-34 (discussing how a "good" tax incentive should maximize "total
profitability or consumer satisfaction after accounting for externalities or barriers to entry").
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of such statutory classifications to the Code would make the tax
incentives therein more congruous with current industry practices and
would better tailor such incentives to promote innovation.
I. THE INNOVATION ECOSYSTEM

Technological innovation is a foundational ethic of the
quintessential American mythology-a mythology replete with a
pantheon of celebrated deities: American inventors.5
As
schoolchildren, Americans learn the history of the nation through its
inventions and the lives of its inventors, from Benjamin Franklin and
his lightning rod, Alexander Graham Bell and his telephone, and the
Wright Brothers and their airplane, to Steve Jobs and his Macintosh
computers.6 Regardless of the era, the basic story is the same: the
rugged individual, spurred by a love of invention and discovery,
creates something new for the benefit of society.
The parallel
story-the story of greed-is not popularly told. 7 When harnessed and
properly channeled to power innovation, the profit motive is an
incredible force for driving innovation. 8 The growing role of IP
intermediaries and nonpracticing entities (NPEs) in the marketplace,
however, is symptomatic of a misalignment of that force and points to
a need for adjusting policies affecting innovation.
A. The Inventors
Congress designed the US patent system to balance the
interests of the inventor with those of society at large by granting the
inventor a temporary monopoly right to the economic benefits of an
invention.9 The system conditions this right on the public disclosure

5.
See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 710
(2012) ("Any elementary school student can recite a number of canonical American invention
stories.. . . Patent law is built around these canonical tales.").
6.
Id.
7.
See id. at 711-15. Lemley attempts to debunk the myth that invention and
innovation in the United States are the sole provenance of individual inventors by showing that
most inventions are "simultaneous"-independently developed by disparate inventors within the
same general timeframe-and that oftentimes the ideas behind inventions are generally known,
or "in the air," rather than truly groundbreaking. Id. at 714. Lemley further puts forth the idea
that "patent races"-a phenomenon whereby invention is "motivated, or at least hastened, not
merely by the hope of reward but by the fear of losing a race to a competitor who in turn obtains
a dominant patent"-are not necessarily detrimental to the health of a patent system. Id. at 712.
Id. at 714.
8.
9.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006); R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Antitrust Div., Address at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, Institute of Law, Beijing, China: Promoting Economic Growth Through Competition
and Innovation (July 1, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/204931.
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of that invention.1 0 The general idea is that the public disclosure of an
invention will promote economic growth by galvanizing entrepreneurs
to market derivative products or to further improve the original
invention." At a glance, the system seems to be working well. From
1963 to 2010, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) granted a total of 4,767,685 utility patents (i.e., patents for
inventions) and saw a steady rise in applications in that period from
85,869 in 1963 to a nearly six-fold increase to 490,226 in 2010.12
Coinciding with the growing volume of patent applications was an
increasingly larger share of economic output in the US economy by
research-intensive industries. 13
Contrary to the romantic notion of the heroic individual
inventor, corporations overwhelmingly dominate innovation in the
United States.
In 2010, corporations received approximately 90
percent of all utility patent grants.1 4 Corporations also accounted for
a great majority of R&D spending, with larger firms (those with at
least one thousand people) generally spending more than three times
that of smaller firms.' 5
The history of R&D spending evidences the importance of R&D
to the US economy. From 1963 to 2007, R&D spending rose from
$19.2 billion to over $400 billion, 16 with private businesses presently
accounting for over two-thirds of that spending. 7 Today, there are
more than sixteen thousand firms that currently operate their own
htm (explaining that the word "Progress" as it was understood in 1789 and in the general context
of the age of enlightenment "meant not only an advancement of science, but also a triumph of the
general good").
10.
35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
11.
Lemley, supra note 5, at 745.
12.

U.S.

PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART: CALENDAR

YEARS 1963-2011 (2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/tafldatalus
stat.htm.
13.

See U.S.

DEP'T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, RESEARCH & DEV.

SATELLITE ACCOUNT, 1959-2007 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DATA tbl.7.1A (2010), available at
http://www.bea.gov/nationallrd.htm. The "total expenditures on R&D represented 2.8% of GDP in
2009," exceeding the rate of the Euprean Union (EU) (1.9 percent) and the average of all OECD
countries (2.3 percent) but was less than Japan (3.3 percent). U.S. CONGRESS JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, TAX INCENTIVES FOR RESEARCH, EXPERIMENTATIONS,

AND INNOVATION

8 (2011),

available at http://www.jet.gov/ publications.html (follow "by year" hyperlink, then follow "JCT
Publications 2011", then select JCX-45-11). In 2009, R&D spending represented 41.24 percent of
all R&D expenditures undertaken by OECD countries, 35 percent greater than the total spent by
the EU and 270 percent greater than the total spent by Japan. Id.
14.

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 12.

15.
See Raymond M. Wolfe, Research and Development in Industry: 2006-07, NAT'L Sl.
FOUND. (June 2011), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf11301/pdf/nsf11301.pdf (showing, in Table
1, spending statistics for 2006, with firms of at least one thousand persons spending
$169,926,000,000 on R&D out of a total of $223,365,000,000 spent by all firms).
16.

U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 13, at tbl.2.1.

17.

See id.

758

VANDERBILT J OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 15:4:753

industrial research labs, and there are at least twenty firms that have
annual R&D budgets in excess of $1 billion.18
Moreover, the most economically significant innovations come
from firms in just two industries: information technology and
biotechnology. 19 The dominance of these industries is evident in the
USPTO's pattern of patent grants between 1986 and 2010, during
which time these two industries almost entirely comprised the list of
firms that received at least one thousand patents. 20 Furthermore, the
five hundred fastest growing firms in the United States as of 2011 are
also nearly exclusively of these two industries. 21
B. The Trolls
Without a doubt, IP (in all its US-recognized forms: patents,
copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets) plays an important role in
the US economy.
According to the Department of Commerce,
IP-intensive industries in the United States accounted for about $5.06
trillion in value added, or about 34.8 percent of US gross domestic
product, and provided for 18.8 percent of all US jobs in 2010.22 And
according to the International Fund Trade Administration, royalties
and license fees in the United States totaled $84.4 billion in
2009-nearly half of the global total estimated for 2009.23 To add
further context, a private study conducted in 2010 found that the
value of intangible assets comprised 80 percent of the total value of
the S&P 500 companies, with patent technologies representing a

18.
Nathan Rosenberg, Innovation and Economic Growth, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION
DEV. CORP., 2 (2004), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/49/34267902.pdf.
19.
See Jennifer Lee & Andrew G. Schmidt, Research and Development Satellite
Account Update: Estimates for 1959-2007, SURV. CURRENT BuS., 16 (2010), http://www.bea.gov/
scb/pdf/2010/12%20December/1210_r-dtext.pdf (showing that these two industries, which
include pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing and scientific R&D industries, accounted
for 68 percent of private business R&D's average contribution to real GDP growth from 1995 to
2007).
20.

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 12.

21.
See Deloitte's 2011 Technology Fast 500 Ranking, DELOITE & TOUCHE LLP (2011),
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/TMT-us-tmt/us
tmt_2011fast500rankings_111411.pdf.
22.

U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S.

ECONOMY:

INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS 45 (2012), available at www.uspto.gov/news/publications/IPReport.
March_2012.pdf; Sean Silverthorne, Monetizing IP: The Executive's Challenge, HARVARD Bus.
SCH. (June 9, 2008), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/pdf/item/5925.pdf (citing a figure presumably given by
the USPTO).
23.

INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. EXPORT FACT SHEET: JANUARY 2010 EXPORT STATISTICS 1

(Mar. 11, 2010), available at http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/migrated/
Fact%20Sheet-January%20exports.pdf.
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substantial portion of this value. 24 Finally, from 1982 to 2006, courts
awarded over $4.5 billion in patent damages in approximately 320
published decisions, with the largest award exceeding $870 million in
1991.25 With so much money in transit, it was inevitable that the
proverbial troll under the bridge would emerge to collect its toll.
Beginning in the 1980s, a new kind of entity in the IP
marketplace emerged: the NPE, also known pejoratively as the
"patent troll." 2 6 Typical NPEs, unlike traditional operating companies
(e.g., Apple, Sony, and IB1VI), neither develop IP nor market goods
derived from IP.27 Rather, these entities exist mainly to extract rents
from traditional operating companies in the form of licensing fees or
litigation damages. 28 In one estimate, there are currently over 380
distinct NPEs; since 1985, these NPEs have been involved in litigation
with over five thousand different operating companies in over four
thousand patent infringement cases. 29
These NPEs are experts in patent litigation. Indeed, damages
awarded to NPEs have averaged more than double those for operating
companies since 1995.30
This trend in damages appears to be
accelerating. Between 2002 and 2009, median damages awarded to
NPEs more than tripled those awarded to operating companies: $12'
million for NPEs compared with $3.4 million for operating
companies. 31 Further, the financial drain that NPEs have caused for
operating companies is not limited to legal damages. One study
estimated that NPEs caused about $500 billion in lost stock value to

24.
Intangible Asset Market Value, OCEAN TOMO, http://www.oceantomo.com/products
andservices/investments/intangible-market-value (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
25.
J. Shawn McGrath & Kathleen M. Kedrowski, Trends in Patent Damages, A.B.A.
SEC. LITIG., http://does.piausa.org/ABA/07-06-01-ABA-Report-On-Patent-Damages.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 27, 2013).
26.
See generally Andrei Hagiu & David Yoffie, Intermediaries for the IP Market 8-9
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-023, 2011), available at http://www.hbs.edu/researchl
pdf/12-023.pdf; Largest Patent Holdings, PATENTFREEDOM, http://www.patentfreedom.comi
research-phl.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011); Gene C. Schaerr & Jacob R. Loshin, Doing Battle
with "Patent Trolls'. Lessons from the Litigation Front Lines, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP (2010),
http://wlflegalpulse.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/troll-presentation-5.pdf.
27.
Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 26.
28.
See id.
29.
Most Pursued Companies, PATENTFREEDOM,
http://www.patentfreedom.com/
research.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
30.
ARON LEVKO ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, A CLOSER LOOK: PATENT
LITIGATION TRENDS AND THE INCREASING IMPACT OF NONPRACTICING ENTITIES 1, 5 (2009),

available at http://www.pwc.com/enUS/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2009-patentlitigation-study.pdf.
31.
Id.
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affected companies during the previous decade. 32 To put that figure
into perspective, $500 billion is nearly the amount of value added to
the US economy by patent-intensive industries in 2010.33

Several factors gave rise to these NPEs, many of which
involved developments in the patent and legal systems: the
overabundance of available patents in the marketplace due to the
boom-and-bust cycle of the 1990s, the USPTO's granting of
poor-quality and overly broad patents, the creation of a dedicated
appeals court for patent disputes in the Federal Circuit, and the
increasingly liberal calculation and use of damage awards and
injunctions, respectively. 34 More importantly, the growing impact of
these NPEs was indicative of the changing nature of IP-related
product development itself-a change toward products requiring
multiple inputs from virtual "thickets" of patented technologies. 35 The
manufacture of integrated circuits is a prime example of this trend:
"[1Manufacturing an integrated circuit requires hundreds of steps,
with literally billions of transistors and thousands of complex
algorithms. No firm-even the industry's largest ones-has more than
30% of the patents required to cover all aspects of semiconductor
design and manufacturing." 36
Typically, operating companies

&

32.
James E. Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls 25-26 (Bos.
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-45, 2011), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/
scholarship/workingpapers/Bessen-Ford-Meurer-troll.html.
33.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 22, at 45 ("Patent-intensive and
copyright-intensive industries accounted for 5.3 and 4.4 percent of GDP, with $763 billion and
$641 billion in value added, respectively.").
34.
See Coriat & Orsi, supra note 1, at 1494-95 (discussing the creation of the US Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the easing of patentability conditions in the 1980s as a
response to industry demands for more uniform patent decisions); Merritt J. Hasbrouck,
Comment, Protecting the Gates of Reasonable Royalty: A Damages Framework for Patent
Infringement Cases, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 192, 195-98 (2011) ("Current law
gives no clear explanation for calculation of a reasonable royalty amount."); McGrath
Kedrowski, supra note 25 at 9-10 (discussing the spread between average damage amounts
between bench and jury trials).
35.
See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
62 n.211 (2005) ("Patent thickets' refer to the fact that in many areas of technology, great
numbers of related patents exist at any particular time, and many might have applicability to
any commercial product."); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent
Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 119-22 (Adam B.
Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (discussing "patent thickets" in the context of an impediment on
innovation partly due to the USPTO's granting of overly broad patents on key technologies); see
generally Mario Benassi & Alberto Di Minin, Playing in Between: Patent Brokers in Markets for
Technology, 39 R&D MGMT. 68, 69-71 (2009) (discussing the conditions giving rise to
cross-licensing practices).
36.
Hagiu & Yoffle, supra note 26, at 17; see Alex Blumberg & Laura Sydell, When
Patents Attack, THIS AM. LIFE (July 26, 2011, 8:04 PM), http://www.npr.orgblogs/money/
2011/07/26/138576167/when-patents-attack (noting Google's desire to purchase Nortel's patents
to defend itself against patent lawsuits and its willingness to spend up to $3 billion for the
acquisition of these patents); David Marcus, Trolls, Geeks and Lots of Lawyers, DEAL MAG. (Oct.
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navigate this "thicket" by the strategic use of cross-licensing
agreements (CLAs), whereby companies resolve potential or actual
legal
disputes
by
entering
into
mutually
beneficial
technology-licensing agreements. 3 7 In fact, companies even hedge
against the threat of litigation by developing or acquiring IP they
believe to be valuable currency for exchange with industry rivals. 38
Given this context, NPEs pose a particularly significant threat
to operating companies since they have no incentive to enter into
CLAs.39 In effect, NPEs can wield the threat of "holdup"-whereby a
patent rights holder of a necessary but noncentral technology
strategically refuses to license the use of that technology in order to
hinder product development or further innovation-with relative
impunity. 40 Not surprisingly, many industry commentators view the

14, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/042051/features/trolls,-geeks-and-lotsof-lawyers.php (reporting on the frenzied purchase during Nortel Network Inc.'s auction of six
thousand patents and patent applications at the end of June 2011 that raked in $4.5 billion from
a team of companies led by Apple, which was answered in retaliation by Google's purchase of
Motorola Mobility for its patents in August 2011 for $12.5 billion).
37.
See Taxation of Cross Licensing Arrangements, I.R.S. Notice 2006-34, 2006-14 I.R.B.
705; Pamela Olson et al., Comments on Notice 2006-34: Taxation of Cross Licenses and Other

Information Sharing Arrangements, 2006 WL 4775035 (July 14, 2006); Shapiro, supra note 35, at
127; see generally Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 6 ("The benefits that can be made to flow from
lasers, microprocessors, computers and information technology generally, will ultimately depend
not only on its inventors, but also on the creativity of the potential users of the new technology.").
38.
Coriat & Orsi, supra note 1, at 1503 ("As pointed out in recent studies, it seems that
most of the patents that the bigger firms have been registering are not meant to protect
inventions. Instead they are supposed to 'hinder' virtual rivals, or create strong bargaining
positions. . . .").
39.
Cross-licensing, whereby operating companies agree to license relevant technologies
to each other for the purpose of product development, is a common and relatively inexpensive
way in which operating companies resolve patent disputes. See Shapiro, supra note 35, at
126-30. NPEs, on the other hand, do not produce or market any products and, hence, cannot be
compelled to settle for a cross-license. See Jiaqing Lu, The Myths and Facts of Patent Troll and
Excessive Payment: Have NonpracticingEntities (NPEs)Been Overcompensated?, 47 BuS. ECON.
234, 235 (2012) ("Because NPEs do not have any revenue exposure in the final product or service
market, the conventional market remedies such as patent pool, cross license, and defensive
patenting are ineffective in preventing NPEs from pursuing holdup tactics."). If an operating
company cannot design around the use of a patent owned by a NPE, then the company is
effectively barred from producing and marketing that dependent product unless it pays
potentially exorbitant rents. See generally id. at 236-47. The holdup threat imposed by NPEs
was significantly increased due to the emergence of the US International Trade Commission
(ITC) as a forum for patent disputes, given the threat of potential trade bans on infringing
products. See Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 26, at 18 (addressing the chilling effect of potential ITC
injunctions).
40.
See Steven Musil, Apple Forced to Deal with Patent Troll?, CNET (Dec. 11, 2011,
9:55 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301- 135793-57340996-37/apple-forced-to-deal-with-patent-troll
("The bigger mystery is why Apple would do this. TechCrunch suggests two scenarios: Either
Apple is using Digitude as a 'hired gun' to go after patent royalties, or Digitude went after Apple
and Apple transferred these patents to assuage Digitude.").
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proliferation of NPEs to be a significant impediment to innovation. 41
As a response to the growing concern over product "holdup," a new
class of entities has emerged in the IP marketplace-the IP
intermediaries.
C. The IP Intermediaries
IP intermediaries are companies that operate in the space
between entities that own or produce IP and entities that seek to
purchase or license IP.42 They exist to mitigate the risk of patent
litigation arising from the complexities of navigating "thickets" of IP
rights. 43 They also exist to help IP owners monetize their IP in an
illiquid market. 44 These companies can be grouped into two general
categories: (a) IP aggregators-entities that own IP rights, and (b) IP
facilitators-entities that facilitate the transfer of IP rights.
1. IP Aggregators
IP aggregators are similar to NPEs in that they are formed for
the purpose of aggregating IP rights with the intent of extracting
rents from operating companies. 45 They differ from NPEs in one
important aspect, although the line between them is very fine: their
mission is to facilitate innovation by ensuring the availability of
patent rights, not to earn profit through patent litigation under the
threat of holdup. 46 Generally, they aim to derive profits from
nonexclusive licensing revenues or membership fees, and they pursue
a competitive advantage in this practice by providing operating
companies with a single, potentially cost-effective source for the
licensing of relevant technologies. 47 They are successful at this
practice because they are uniquely capable of efficiently identifying,

See Bessen, supra note 32, at 2, 25-26 (finding that very little of the $500 billion in
41.
lost wealth attributed to the actions of NPEs from 1990 to 2010 has actually transferred to
inventors, suggesting a decrease in incentives for innovation overall); Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note
26, at 18 ("Consequently, NPEs have a negative effect on innovation by operating
companies . . .. "); Paul McNamara, Patent Trolls vs. Innovation, NETWORK WORLD (Nov. 2, 2011,
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/102611-tech-argument-patent-trollsAM),
6:08
innovation-252427.html.
Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 26, at 1, 6-13.
42.
Id. at 5-6.
43.
Id.
44.
Id. at 9-10.
45.
See id. at 9-12.
46.
Id.; see also John Cook, Looking to Fend Off Patent Trolls, IBM, Cisco, Support
47.
Startup RPX, PUGET SOUND BUS. J. (Nov. 23, 2008, 7:09 PM), http://www.techflash.comlseattle/
2008/1 1/IBMCisco-supportRPXindefensive-patents34959854.html.
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valuing, and purchasing IP assets on a large scale. 48 RPX 4 9 and
Intellectual Ventures 5 0 are notable examples of companies in this
group.
RPX is one of several companies commonly referred to as
"defensive aggregators" or "defensive patent pools"-entities that
groups of operating companies have formed in reaction to the threat of
holdup by industry rivals and NPEs. 51 Defensive aggregators are in
the business of purchasing IP assets of interest to their member
companies and, via nonexclusive collective licensing agreements,
helping to ensure that these companies have rights to use the
underlying technologies in the production of their goods. 52 Defensive
aggregators bestow another important benefit to their member
companies: they mitigate the risk of patent litigation by taking
potentially toxic IP assets out of the marketplace and out of the reach
of NPEs. 53
For this service, member companies pay annual
subscription fees ranging from tens of thousands to millions of dollars,
depending on income. 54
Intellectual Ventures operates similarly to RPX and other
defensive aggregators in the sense that it accumulates patents on a
large scale and makes the technologies represented by these patents
available to licensees for a fee.5 5 But that is where the similarities
end. Unlike defensive aggregators, which exist in order to mitigate
the risk of product holdup and litigation for member companies,
Intellectual Ventures exists in order to engage in rent-seeking
behaviors aimed at maximizing profits from its IP portfolio-making it
not unlike an NPE, a distinction for which it can be described as an
offensive aggregator. 56

48.
See Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 26, at 18.
49.
RPX CORP., Patent Litigation Used to be a Form of Legal Redress. Today It Is a
Business Model, http://www.rpxcorp.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
50.
INTELLECTUAL VENTURES, http://www.intellectualventures.com (last visited Nov. 19,
2011).
51.
See Cook, supra note 47; see generally Shapiro, supra note 35, at 127-28 (describing
patent pools).
52.
See Cook, supra note 47.
53.
See id.
54.
Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 26, at 20.
55.
Hagiu and Yoffie describe Intellectual Ventures as a "hybrid between a NPE and a
defensive patent aggregator," but highlight Intellectual Venture's distinguishing feature:
"[M]any of its investors are strategic and include prominent technology companies such as
Amazon, American Express, Apple, Cisco, eBay, Google, Intel, Microsoft (which was the lead
investor), Nokia, SAP, Sony, Samsung, and Verizon." Id. at 11.
56.
Amol Sharma & Don Clark, Tech Guru Riles the Industry by Seeking Huge Patent
Fees, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122161127802345821.html.
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No other nonoperating company in history has ever controlled
more patents.5 7 As of mid-2011, Intellectual Ventures had amassed
more than thirty thousand patents (compared with about one
thousand five hundred owned by RPX).5 8 Moreover, since its founding,
it has earned over $2 billion in licensing fees, with $700 million
earned just in 201059 (compared with about $153 million in expected
revenue for RPX in 2011).60

At first glance, IP aggregators such as Intellectual Ventures
and RPX appear to provide successful market-driven solutions to
ensnarement by patent "thickets" and harassment by NPEs. For
instance, by controlling a large pool of interrelated patents and by
licensing exclusively to operating companies, IP aggregators can
reduce both litigation risks and IP procurement costs. Indeed, they
can keep patents out of the hands of NPEs and eliminate the
incremental costs of searching and negotiating a multitude of
licensing agreements from a multitude of disparate sources. 61 IP
aggregators can also effectively deliver lowered procurement costs to
operating companies by leveraging economies of scale, which they
achieve through sheer purchasing power and expertise in finding
undervalued IP assets. 62 Finally, these aggregators can increase the
liquidity of IP assets by voraciously purchasing patent rights-buying
from IP owners who otherwise would have trouble finding a market
for their patents. 63
But some problems are beginning to emerge that bring to
question the efficacy of IP aggregators as a solution to patent holdups.
First, both offensive aggregators and defensive aggregators practice
"catch-and-release" patent monetization, whereby value is extracted
once through the assignment of licenses to member companies and
then again by the reselling of these patents, sometimes to NPEs. 64

57.
Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 26, at 22 ("[Iintellectual Ventures] has brought more
resources (more than $5 billion in committed capital) and has developed a larger controlling
position of patents than any non-operating company in history.").
58.
See id.; see also Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 1, 3-4.
59.
John Letzing, Myhrvold's Patent Firm Sees Revenue Swell: Intellectual Ventures
Licensing Revenue Hits $700 Million in 2010, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 4, 2011, 1:59 AM),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/myhrvolds-patent-firm-sees-revenue-swell-2011-03-04.
60.
Press Release, RPX, RPX Announces Third Quarter 2011 Financial Results (Nov. 1,
2011), available at http://ir.rpxcorp.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=619881.
61.
Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 26, at 18, 23.
62.
Id. at 20, 22 (reporting that RPX spent over $250 million in acquiring IP assets and
that Intellectual Ventures has over $5 billion in committed capital).
63.
Id. at 22 (describing purchasing activity by Intellectual Ventures at certain IP
auctions as "creat[ing] the illusion of liquidity in the patent market").
Id. at 18, 21.
64.
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Depending on the terms of these licensing agreements, operating
companies can effectively face two layers of value extraction: first,
from licensing fees paid to IP aggregators, and second, from litigation
damages or settlements with NPEs who have acquired patents in
subsequent "releases."6 5 The second layer of value extraction is
potentially more problematic than the first since an operating
company may already produce and market products using the
allegedly infringing technology, making the consequences of holdup
much more severe.66
A second problem with reliance on IP aggregators is that they
may themselves behave like NPEs. 67
For instance, Intellectual
Ventures has recently started to file litigation claims on its own
behalf, a development that has caused some commentators to
characterize it as a "patent troll on steroids." 68 Furthermore, there is
evidence that prior to directly filing lawsuits, Intellectual Ventures
effectively outsourced litigation to NPEs by entering into
behind-the-scenes revenue-sharing agreements in which it shared in
any litigation damages extracted from the patents it sold to these
NPEs. 69 Technologists truly fear Intellectual Ventures given its
alleged anticompetitive practices and its ability to "literally obliterate
startups."70

Finally, IP aggregators are essentially the quasi-autonomous
offensive litigation arms of operating companies,7 1 akin in spirit to
multinational military pacts (e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization). Like military pacts, IP aggregators can shield their
constituents from the psychological and financial costs of offensive
65.
Brian T. Yeh, An Overview of the "Patent Trolls Debate", CONG. RES. SERVICE 6-8
(Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misclR42668.pdf.
66.
See Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34
J. CORP. L. 1151, 1188 (2009) (describing the practice of "patent ambush" in which an operating
company is sued for patent infringement after the patent holder induces it to produce products
reading on the allegedly infringed-upon patent).
67.
See Blumberg & Sydell, supra note 36.
68.
Lisa Lerer, Going Once, CORP. COUNSEL (Nov. 1, 2005), http://www.1aw.com/
corporatecounsel/PubArticleFriendlyCC.jsp?id=900005439584
(acknowledging that there is
concern regarding whether "Intellectual Ventures is ...
a 'patent troll on steroids,' stockpiling
patents to hold entire industries hostage"); see also Zusha Elinson, Intellectual Ventures Takes
Indirect Route to Court, RECORDER (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticle
CA.jsp?id=1202433488815 (describing the fact that "you never know what unscrupulous and
lawsuit-prone troll is going to buy it" as the threat inherent in selling patents to third parties).
69.
Blumberg & Sydell, supra note 36 ("Peter Detkin, an attorney who co-founded
Intellectual Ventures with Nathan Myhrvold, told us that IV likely has a 'back-end arrangement'
with Oasis.").
70.
Id. (recounting a venture capitalist's sentiment that there is a lot of fear about
Intellectual Ventures given that it has the power to "literally obliterate startups").
71.
Companies that invested in Intellectual Ventures indirectly benefit from any
offensive actions that it takes. See Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 26, at 11.
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actions as well as hide the identity of the true aggressors.7 2 Without
prohibitive costs or fear of reprisals, constituent operating companies
may be more likely to use IP aggregators as vehicles to engage in
anticompetitive behaviors. 73
Absent the anonymity that IP
aggregators may provide, operating companies would have greater
incentive to engage in cross-licensing negotiations for fear of mutually
assured destruction from patent holdups. 74
2. IP Facilitators
IP facilitators perform a variety of intermediary functions
intended to assist patent owners in monetizing patent rights through
sales, licensing agreements, and other creative monetization
techniques.7 5 These companies are unlike IP aggregators in that they
typically neither own nor seek to own the IP in question. 76 Moreover,
companies in this group are usually small and have been relatively
unsuccessful compared with IP aggregators.7 7 Companies in this
group can be organized into three categories: (i) platforms or
exchanges, (ii) brokers or agents, and (iii) financiers. Of these three
general categories, platforms-or-exchanges and brokers-or-agents are
the primary players in facilitating IP transfers, and they can be
considered prototypical "IP intermediaries." In some cases, companies
play more than one role.
Companies that fall into the platforms-or-exchanges category
provide electronic platforms on which patent owners and rights
seekers can find each other and engage in desired IP transactions.7 8
Although these services in their purest forms resemble commercial
listing websites like eBay or Craigslist, the illiquidity of IP assets
72.
Id. at 10-12.
73.
Id. at 11.
Taking this military analogy further, IP aggregators outsourcing patent litigation to
74.
NPEs is akin to the military outsourcing specific engagements to mercenaries or terrorists.
Interestingly, the following passage by Machiavelli describing military mercenaries could also be
used to describe NPEs:
The mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous, and if anyone supports
his state by the arms of mercenaries, he will never stand firm or sure, as they are
disunited, ambitious, without discipline, faithless, bold amongst friends, cowardly
amongst enemies, they have no fear of God, and keep no faith with men.
NICCoL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 50 (Rositer Johnson & Dora K. Ranous eds., 1907).
75.
See, e.g., Hagiu & Yoffie, supranote 26, at 18.
76.
See id. at 9.
77.
See, e.g., Benassi & Di Minin, supra note 35, at 83 ("We believe that patent brokers
tend to emerge and be co-localized in highly innovative areas. The reasons are simple. Patent
brokers have been, up to now, small-medium companies with limited resources."). See generally
Raymond Millien & Ron Laurie, Meet the Middlemen, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., 53-58 (2008),
http://www.iam-magazine.com/article.ashx?g-449a0f0e-630b-4c51-8fb4-2a4fe550f03c.
Id. at 55-56.
78.
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necessitates much more hands-on involvement by intermediary agents
knowledgeable in perfecting such transactions.79 Therefore, these
companies also provide brokerage services, with agents ready to
advise and perfect the transaction immediately after interested
parties have discovered each other using the platform and agreed to
an exchange.80
In some cases, platform providers perform live
auctions in order to "make" markets for listed IP.8I
Companies that fall into the brokers-or-agents category help
alleviate the information gap between buyers and sellers of IP
assets. 82 Like in other markets where information asymmetries
characterize economic exchanges, it is often difficult to value and
market IP assets. These companies alleviate this problem by drawing
on their particular expertise in the dealing of IP assets. 83 In some
cases, they prepare and conduct the actual IP transaction. 84 For these
services, patent brokers receive commissions as high as 50 percent of
the value of the transaction. 85
Companies that fall into the financiers category are essentially
financial services firms that specialize in dealing with IP assets.8 6
The range of services these firms offer is quite varied and depends on
the specialty of the firm. Some services include advising corporate or
university spin outs, advising mergers and acquisitions transactions,
securitizing IP assets, and arranging venture capital investments.
The emergence of IP facilitators has generated positive
industry buzz and academic optimism regarding increased liquidity in
the IP markets.8 7
Generally, this excitement is based on three
Id.
79.
80.
Yet2.com and Tynax.com are examples of companies that provide a listing and
matching service whereby interested parties can post information on their needs, and after
parties are matched, agents of these companies offer their services to assist in completing the
transaction. See YET2.COM, http://www.yet2.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2011); TYNAX.COM,
http://www.tynax.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
81.
Ocean Tomo calls itself "The Intellectual Capital Merchant Banc Firm" and provides
a number of patent intermediation services including auctions, listings, brokerage, and financing
and investment-banking services. OCEAN TOMO, http://www.oceantomo.com (last visited Nov. 19,
2011).
82.
See Millien & Laurie, supra note 77, at 55.
Id.
83.
84.
Id.
85.
Licensing Agent Fees: How Much Do Licensing Agents and Invention Brokers Charge
for Their Services, INVENTIONSTATISTICS.COM,

http://www.inventionstatistics.com/Licensing

AgentFees.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011); see also Eric Young, Patent Marketeers, S.F. Bus.
TIMES (Mar. 23, 2008, 9:00 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2008/03/24/
focus1.html (estimating that "most IP brokers ...
earn[] commissions in the double-digits on
each deal").
86.
See Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 26; Millien & Laurie, supra note 77.
87.
See Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 26, at 1 ("And indeed, during the last 5-10 years a
variety of novel and intriguing intermediaries has emerged, all using different business models
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propositions, all of which directly impact innovation. First, increased
liquidity
leads to
increased opportunities
for technology
monetization.8 8 Second, more opportunities for monetization will
galvanize IP creation and innovation.8 9
Third, facilitators will
facilitate the transfer of technologies to companies that can put them
into productive use.9 0 But there is some evidence that, so far, these
companies have been ineffective in this regard. 9 1 For instance, the
majority of the patents sold at auctions organized by a leading IP
brokerage company appear to have gone into the wrong hands: 75.8
percent of the patents sold at auction have gone to Intellectual
Ventures, 13 percent have gone to NPEs, and just 11.2 percent have
gone to operating companies. 92 Given that Intellectual Ventures
essentially operates as an NPE, 93 nearly 90 percent of all patents
transacted by this brokerage company have actually gone to entities
engaging in practices potentially detrimental to innovation.
Despite the discouraging revelation that, at least in some
cases, NPEs may be the primary purchasers of IP assets transacted by
these intermediaries, IP facilitators may still play an important role in
the IP marketplace in terms of increasing liquidity. Their actions may
still have the potential to positively affect innovation. Assuming that
the encouragement of IP intermediation is sound policy, the task
before policymakers then is one of ensuring that IP assets are
transferred to companies that can put them to productive use.
II. DISTINGUISHING INNOVATORS FROM TROLLS
As discussed in Part I, innovation in the high-growth,
high-technology information-technology industry and biotechnology
industry is characterized by the interactions of three groups of
entities: operating companies, NPEs, and IP intermediaries. 9 4 An
optimal policy to promote innovation would favor the productive

while attempting to bring more liquidity to the patent market."); see also Benassi & Di Minin,
supra note 35, at 83 ("Patent brokers are market makers, in the sense that they 'play in between'
technology demand and supply. They make decisions and take actions by promoting new
connections. They search for new, viable solutions. They organize and orchestrate the needed
resources.").

88.
See Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 26, at 1-2.
See id. at 24.
89.
See id. at 14 (noting that Intellectual Ventures is the single largest buyer at Ocean
90.
Tomo auctions, accounting for over 70 percent of all purchases).
91.
See id.
92.
Publicly Auctioned Patent Buyers: Intellectual Ventures & Others, AvANCEPT LLC,
http://www.avancept.com/iv-report-auction.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
See Blumberg & Sydell, supra note 36; Letzing, supra note 59.
93.
94.
See generally Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 26.
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activities of operating companies and IP intermediaries (i.e., IP
creation and exchange) and disfavor the unproductive activities of
NPEs (i.e., holdup and value extraction). Federal tax law can be an
important instrument in the implementation of such a policy in that
an awareness of the distinctions between these entities in the Code
will allow Congress to narrowly target the various incentives for
innovation therein. At a minimum, improving the Code in this
manner would require definitions for operating companies and NPEs.
A. Identifying OperatingCompanies
Currently, the Code promotes technological investment and
research activity across a broad swath of industries by remaining
mostly silent about who may claim the various pro-innovation tax
incentives. 95 As Part III discusses, however, there are certain
instances where a clear definition of qualified entities is necessary in
order to improve the Code.
Some state tax codes already include meaningful definitions of
the types of entities entitled to claim innovation incentives. The state
of Hawai'i and the District of Columbia (DC) provide models for what
such a definition in the Code may look like. The state of Hawai'i
confers several state tax benefits upon "Qualified High Technology
Businesses" (QHTBs) and their investors. 96 Similarly, DC provides
tax benefits to "Qualified High Technology Companies" (QHTCs).9 7
Both Hawai'i and DC define qualified entities using some combination
of income thresholds, operations requirements, and industry
classifications. For instance, to be a QHTB in Hawai'i, more than 50
percent of a business's activities must be "qualified research," as
defined by § 41 of the Code, 98 or more than 75 percent of its gross
income must derive from "qualified research," provided that the
business receives this income from either products "sold from,
manufactured in, or produced in" the state or from services performed

95.
See I.R.C. § 1235 (2006) (limiting benefits granted to qualified "holder[s]" of patent
rights); cf. id. §§ 41, 174.
96.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 235-7.3 (2012) (exclusion from gross income of royalties derived
from intangibles developed by QHTBs); id. § 235-110.9 (tax credit for investments in QHTBs); id.
§ 235-110.91 (tax credit for research activities conducted by QHTBs); see generally David H. Hu,
Comment, Seed Capital is Not Enough: Lessons from Hawai'i's Attempt to Develop a
High-Technology Sector, 30 U. HAW. L. REV. 401 (2008).
97.
See D.C. CODE § 47-1808.01(5) (2012) (exemption from the unincorporated business
tax); id. § 47-1817.02-1817.05 (tax credits covering human-resources costs); GOV'T OF D.C.,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF FIN. OFFICER, OFFICE OF TAX AND REVENUE, QUALIFIED HIGH TECHNOLOGY

COMPANIES (2001), available at http://app.cfo.de.gov/services/tax/forms/forms/HiTechPub399.
pdf.
98.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 235-7.3(c)(1).
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in the state. 99 Similarly, to be a QHTC in DC, at least 51 percent of a
business's gross income must derive from activities in one of five
technology categories,10 0 and the business must have at least two
employees.10 1 DC further lists types of businesses that do not qualify
for QHTC status. 102
A definition in the Code identifying qualified operating
companies could use similar criteria. Setting a threshold requirement
for income derived from "qualified research" as defined by § 41 of the
Code is minimally restrictive and does not run counter to the policy
behind the overall system of incentives for innovation in the Code that
depend on that term. 103 Further, setting operational requirements,
such as minimum employee numbers and income sources (e.g.,
products and services), would narrow the definition to companies
Also, targeting
actively engaged in the productive use of IP.104
particular industries and listing excluded business types can further
tune this definition.

B. Identifying Harmful NPEs
As Part III discusses, the use of a statutory definition of a
harmful NPE, instead of a qualified operating company, in certain
provisions of the Code would be more practical. Such a definition
could borrow from the structure of the definition for a qualified
operating company; that is, the definition could specify an income

99.
Id. § 235-110.9(g).
100.
The categories covered include: (1) Internet-related activities; (2) information and
and processing technologies; (4)
communication technologies; (3) advanced-materials
engineering, production, biotechnology or defense technologies; and (5) electronic and photonic
devices and components. D.C. CODE § 47-1817.01(5)(A)(iii).
101.
Id. § 47-1817.01(5)(A).
102.
Id. § 47-1817.01(5)(B).
103.
The term "qualified research" is used throughout various sections of the Code in the
context of "qualified research expenses" (QRE). See, e.g., I.R.C § 280C(c) (2006) (denying a
deduction for the portion of QRE or basic research expenses equal to the amount of the elected
research credit). The purpose for granting the research credit in § 41 of the Code, as added by the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, was to stimulate innovation. Specifically, Congress stated
the following reasons: (1) To overcome the resistance of some businesses to incur the significant
costs involved in research projects; (2) To encourage companies to engage in research activities
which might otherwise not be undertaken because of the reluctance to allocate scarce funds for
"uncertain rewards"; (3) That incentives to stimulate productivity would lead to greater private
activity in research; and (4) The decline in R&D activities in the United States adversely affected
economic growth and competitiveness in world markets and needed to be addressed. See S. REP.
No. 97-144 (1981), reprintedin 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 181-82.
104.
Such an operational requirement would weed out NPEs existing solely on paper. See
Blumberg & Sydell, supra note 36 (noting that some NPEs are nothing more than a group of
lawyers running "paper" companies with empty offices).
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threshold and operations or industry requirements.105 For example,
the Code could define a harmful NPE as a business that receives at
least 51 percent of its gross income from royalties derived from IP
developed neither in-house nor through the use of contractual R&D
services. Defining a harmful NPE in this manner targets the fact that
the vast majority of patent holdings by NPEs are not developed by
those NPEs. Furthermore, such a definition may apply in other
situations where IP rights are similarly abused, such as the
tax-avoidance schemes involving IP holding companies. 106
III. INNOVATION AND THE CODE

As Part I discusses, the development and dissemination of
technological innovation in the modern IP ecosystem involves the
interactions of distinct sets of actors, some of whom operate to benefit
the progress of innovation while others act to impede it. Although the
primary mechanism for promoting innovation should probably not
come from tax law, 107 the Code already contains provisions that with
slight modification could better promote their desired effects on
innovation. Namely, the suggested modifications to the Code detailed
below will better incentivize inventors and operating companies to
create, exchange, and productively use IP assets and foreclose
opportunities for NPEs to misappropriate tax incentives.
A. Incentivizing Inventors and OperatingCompanies
Generally, there are two areas of the Code where Congress can
make improvements to better incentivize technological innovation:
rules governing IP asset creation and exchange and rules incentivizing
investments in technology companies. Many of these improvements
are incremental in nature, like adjusting the depreciation schedule of
IP assets.10 8 A change in these rules to narrowly tailor the incentives
therein would improve their effects.

Cf. HAW. REV. STAT. § 235-110.9(g).
105.
106.
See generally Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Holding Intellectual Property, 39 GA. L. REV.
1155 (2005) (discussing the general scheme of tax avoidance using IP holding companies and the
constitutional challenges to limiting them).
107.

U.S. CONGRESS JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 13, at 16-18 (stating that

although current data indicates research spending in the United States is not at efficient levels,
the effect of tax policy on research activity is largely uncertain because there is relatively little
consensus regarding the magnitude of the responsiveness of research to changes in taxes and
other factors affecting its price).
108.
The following are common recommendations for improving the Code: (1) make
various tax credits usable against AMT; (2) regularly review the economic lives of intangible
assets and adjust depreciation schedules accordingly; (3) extend § 1202 to cover investments in
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1. Exempt Early-Stage High-Technology Companies from the
Personal-Holding-Company Surtax
The Personal-Holding-Company (PHC) surtax under §§ 541
and 542 seeks to eliminate incentives for taxpayers to create
"incorporated pocketbooks." 109 The PHC surtax was introduced at a
time when the top corporate tax rate was lower than the top
individual tax rate, and when wealthy individuals and families would
abuse this tax rate differential by placing their investment assets into
controlled corporations so that the income generated from those assets
would be taxed at a lower rate.1 10 Without change, this provision may
inadvertently impede technological innovation at the point of IP
creation.
The PHC surtax is prohibitively costly to companies that fall
outside its exemptions. Currently, the PHC surtax is set at 15 percent
of a corporation's undistributed "personal holding company income"11 1
and is imposed on a qualified corporation whenever at least 60 percent
of its adjusted ordinary gross income for the taxable year is "personal
holding company income." 112 A qualified corporation is one in which
no more than five individuals either directly or indirectly owned at
least 50 percent of the value of the stock in the company during the
last half of the taxable year. 113 Unless a corporation is of a type

&

other business forms in addition to C-corporations; (4) broaden § 174 to include patent licensing
costs; and (5) broaden § 1235 to include transferring entities other than individuals. See Tax
Reform Options: Incentives for Innovation, HearingBefore the S. Fin. Comm., 112th Cong. (2011)
(statement of Annette Nellen, Professor, San Jose State University); Jeffrey A. Maine
Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The Unequal Tax Treatment of Intellectual Property, 2011 TAx NOTES
TODAY 931, 934-35; Nguyen & Maine, supranote 2, at 838-45.
109.
Edward A. Morgan, The Domestic Technology Base Company: The Dilemma of an
Operating Company Which Might Be a PersonalHolding Company, 33 TAX L. REV. 233, 237-40
(1978). Morgan points to statutes and congressional reports to support the proposition that, 'The
personal holding company tax was enacted in 1934 (and significantly strengthened in 1937 and
in 1964) to mechanically impose a stiff penalty on 'incorporated pocketbooks,' 'incorporated
yachts,' 'incorporated talents' and the like, without any necessity for proving a purpose of
avoiding income taxes." See id. at 239-40 (footnotes omitted).
110.
See id.
111.
I.R.C. § 541 (2006), amended by American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-240, § 102(c)(1)(B), 126 Stat. 2313, 2319 (2013).
Classification as a "personal holding company" occurs when two requirements are
112.
met: (1) at least 60 percent of a corporation's adjusted ordinary gross income is "personal holding
company income," and (2) at any time during the last half of the taxable year, more than 50
percent in value of a corporation's outstanding stock is owned, directly or indirectly, by or for five
or fewer individuals. Id. § 542(a). A "personal holding company" is any corporation, other than a
corporation described in I.R.C. § 542(c), where at least 60 percent of its adjusted ordinary gross
income is "personal holding company income." Id. "Personal holding company income" means the
portion of adjusted gross income that consists of certain classes of passive income touching on
qualified dividends, interest, royalties, and rents. Id. § 543(a).
Id. §542(a).
113.
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exempted under § 542(c), if it passes the income and ownership tests,
it qualifies as a PHC and is subject to the surtax, even if the company
is not an "incorporated pocketbook."1 14
Unfortunately, in some instances, early-stage high-technology
startups may unwittingly fall into this trap. Take, for instance, a
startup with five founders who have licensed two patents (Patent One
The
and Patent Two) with which they intend to build products.
founders decide that it makes good business sense to sublicense
Patent One and use the resulting revenues to develop a product
incorporating the technology of Patent Two. They will, at a later date,
use the earnings from that initial product to fund product
development incorporating Patent One. Despite their intention to
retain the sublicensing royalties for product development and not for
tax evasion as preempted by § 541, this startup would nevertheless be
subject to the surtax. 115
The unintended tax that the PHC surtax imposes on legitimate
technology companies has been observed for at least thirty years.1 1 6
The solution to removing it, however, is actually quite simple: add
high-technology startup companies and other legitimate IP-oriented
companies to the list of exempted business types in § 542(c). Such an
addition would align with the PHC surtax's legislative intent of not
hampering active operating businesses.1 1 7 Congress has used § 542(c)
as a safety valve; indeed, for a period of about forty years after the
enactment of the PHC surtax in 1937, Congress continually added to
the list of exempted businesses.1 1 8 In sum, a modification to § 542(c)

114.
Id.
115.
Walter E. Daniels, The Personal Holding Company Tax: A Potential Trap for Early
Stage High Tech Companies, WRALTECHWIRE (Feb. 20, 2008), http://wraltechwire.com/business/
tech-wireopinion/story/2458989.
116.
See, for example, Morgan, supra note 109, at 240-44, published in 1978, and which
discusses the unintended impact of the PHC surtax on technology companies.
117.
The 1937 committee reports discussed the protection of operating companies:
"Under existing law, rents are excluded from the [personal holding company income]
classification. This was done principally so as not to interfere with bona-fide and legitimate
operating companies, whose business consisted of the ownership and operation of office
buildings, apartment houses, etc." Morgan, supra note 109, 240-41 (citation omitted).
118.
Id. at 241-44. Such businesses include:
[Hiolders of mineral, oil, or gas royalties (in 1937); licensed personal finance
companies (in 1938); affiliated groups of railroad corporations (in 1938); industrial
banks and Morris Plan companies (in 1942); other small loan companies and finance
companies (in 1950); corporations renting property to shareholders for use in an active
commercial, industrial or mining enterprise (in 1950, retroactive to 1945); domestic
building and loan associations (in 1951); shipping enterprises depositing amounts in
Merchant Marine Act reserves (in 1954); corporate affiliated groups generally (in
1954); corporations renting property to shareholders but not having other significant
personal holding company income (in 1954); small business investment companies (in
1959); music publishers (in 1960); movie producers (in 1964 and again in 1976);
securities dealers handling U.S. government bonds (in 1964); manufacturers leading
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to exempt certain high-technology startup companies would comport
with the original legislative intent of this provision and alleviate an
unintended nuisance on technological innovation at the point of IP
creation.
2. Expand the Narrow Definition of "Research and Experimental
Expenditures" to Include Patent Acquisitions
Sections 174 and 41 provide tax incentives to encourage
research activity and to stimulate technological development.1 19
Section 174 gives taxpayers the option of either currently deducting or
amortizing certain "research and experimental expenditures," 12 0 while
§ 41 gives taxpayers an incremental credit for any increases in those
expenditures above a base amount. 121 Congress's intent in creating
these provisions was to encourage innovation by decreasing the
business risks associated with research in technologies exhibiting
uncertain market value. 122
Generally, §§ 174 and 41 work in conjunction to incentivize
activities falling into a narrow definition of R&D, effectively limiting
the application of these incentives to just those expenses that are
proximately related to laboratory research. 123 Specifically, according
to the regulations, the term "research or experimental expenditures"
as used in these sections means expenditures incurred in connection
with the taxpayer's trade or business that represent R&D costs in the
"experimental or laboratory sense." 1 24 The regulations further state,
albeit in broad language, that to qualify as a cost in the experimental
or laboratory sense, the cost must be incurred "for activities intended
to discover information that would eliminate uncertainty concerning
the development or improvement of a product." 12 5 Despite this broad
language, the IRS and the courts have narrowly interpreted qualified
expenses under § 174 to be limited to in-house wages and necessary
overhead costs (e.g., costs of facilities, utilities and maintenance, and
their products and also realizing related royalty income (1964, and again in 1966);
corporate affiliated groups with life insurance subsidiaries (in 1974); and franchisors
leasing the franchise and other property to shareholders for use in an active business
(in 1976).
Id.
119.
See Tax Reform Options: Incentives for Innovation, supra note 108, at 4-5; Nguyen
& Maine, supra note 2, at 831-33.
120.
I.R.C. § 174(a)-(b) (2006).
121.
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 102(c)(1)(B), 126 Stat.
2313, 2326-27 (2013).
122.
See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 2, at 831-33.
123.
Id.
124.
Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1994).
Id.
125.
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supplies) related to research that either the taxpayer or a third party
working on behalf of the taxpayer has directly incurred. 126
Moreover, in situations where capital assets are involved, the
regulations make a strong distinction between the cost of developing
an asset as a result of research versus the cost of acquiring an asset
that another party has developed: only the former is eligible for
special treatment under § 174.127 This distinction is explicit with
respect to patents where the regulations disqualify the costs
associated with "[t]he acquisition of another's patent, model,
production or process," 128 but allow the costs, including attorneys' fees,
of "making and perfecting a patent application." 12 9
Although Congress designed this distinction to work in
harmony with the intangible-asset-depreciation
rules, 130 it is
incongruous with current R&D practices in high-technology industries
where products are characterized by a substantial interdependence of
disparate technologies. 13 1 Take, for instance, the estimate that no
single firm owns more than 30 percent of the patents required to
design and manufacture a semiconductor.1 32 In this case, it is
conceivable that the largest cost component of researching new ways
to design or manufacture these products actually comes from the
licensing or acquisition of necessary patents.
This incongruity also arises in biotechnology research where it
is common industry practice for companies to enter into collaboration
agreements with each other for the right to exploit the result of
promising high-risk research. Usually, these agreements arise when a
126.
See Rev. Rul. 73-275, 1973-1 C.B. 134 (determining that unspecified overhead costs
of a product engineering department were covered by § 174 given that the development and
design of each product is undertaken at the taxpayer's risk); Rev. Rul. 73-20, 1973-1 C.B. 133
(determining that expenses paid to an intermediary administrative organization that channeled
funds to a separate organization conducting research were covered by § 174); see also Kilroy v.
Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 292 (1980) (holding that a taxpayer's research and experimental
inventing activities as well as office expenses related to inventing were deductible under § 174
because his patent applications and marketing activities showed that he was engaged in the
trade or business of inventing); Magee v. Comm'r, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1277 (1973) (holding that a
broad range of general business-related overhead costs associated with the invention of a
scaffolding device by a painter qualified under § 174).
127.
See Rev. Rul. 73-275, 1973-1 C.B. 134 (distinguishing between the costs of
developing the concept of a product and the costs of developing the product itself); Rev. Rul.
73-20, 1973-1 C.B. 133 (distinguishing between acquiring a model and acquiring land or
depreciable property); Magee, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1277 (holding that goods purchased to use
predominantly for innovation may fall under § 174).
128.
Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(3)(vi) (as amended in 1994).
129.
Id. § 1.174-2(a)(1).
130.
See generally I.R.C. § 197 (2006) (setting forth depreciation rules for intangible
assets).
131.
See supra Part I.
Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 26, at 17.
132.
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smaller company with promising research in the development of a
precursor technology does not have the proper resources to bring its
product to fruition. 133 To overcome this problem, the smaller firm
contracts with a larger firm that has an interest in incorporating the
smaller firm's potential technology into a commercial product. These
agreements usually involve up-front payments, as well as milestone
payments, by the larger firm to the smaller firm for incremental
progress in R&D (e.g., advancement to Phase III clinical trials, filing
of a New Drug Application, or receiving FDA marketing approval). 134
Although the larger firm would like to claim these payments as
qualified research expenses under § 174, the current regime
characterizes these payments as capital expenses subject to
§ 263(a). 135 Oddly though, if the product were a depreciable asset
instead of a patent, these expenses might possibly be deductible under

§

174.136

In light of these incongruities with current R&D practices,
modifying § 174 by removing the bar on patent acquisition expenses
might better achieve Congress's original intent in enacting this
provision. Some additional rules must be in place, however, in order
to protect against abuse. First, there should be some mechanism to
recapture the benefits from current deductions or the potentially
shorter amortization schedule under § 174 in the event that the
acquired patent is used to generate income as a stand-alone capital
asset. For instance, when the taxpayer begins to derive royalties from
the acquired patent independent from the technology resulting from
his research, the costs associated with acquiring that patent should
133.
Jennifer Giordano-Coltart & Charles W. Calkins, Best Practices in Patent License
Negotiations, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1 (Oct. 26, 2007), http://www.nature.com/bioent/2007/
071001/full/bioe.2007.5.html.
134.
See id. at 3 ("[A] typical license will include a signing fee, reimbursement and
ongoing payment of patent prosecution costs, milestone payments, minimum annual royalties
and a percentage royalty on sales.").
135.
Memorandum from John Risacher to IRS Industry Directors, Industry Director
Directive on the Proper Treatment of Upfront Fees, Milestone Payments, Royalties and Deferred
Income (May 7, 2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Industry-Director-Directive-onthe-Proper-Treatment-of-Upfront-Fees,-Milestone-Payments,-Royalties-and-Deferred-Income.
Industry Director John Risacher explained:
Generally, these type[s] of costs are not currently deductible under I.R.C. § 174 either
because they represent payments to participate (entry fees) in the research endeavor
or because they represent payments for already developed know how, and thus are not
a cost of research that is yet to be performed. Rather, these payments are capital
expenditures subject to I.R.C. § 263(a).
Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(1), (3) (as amended in 2004).
136.
See Rev. Rul. 69-484, 1969-2 C.B. 38 (allowing an airline to claim, as I.R.C. § 174
expenses, payments made to an aircraft manufacturer to defray the cost of design, development,
and fabrication of a prototype aircraft that the manufacturer would eventually develop for sale in
its business and where the units of which would be available for sale to the airline).
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permanently revert to a capital expense adhering to a fifteen year
depreciation schedule under § 197, as opposed to an immediate
deduction or a greatly shortened schedule under § 174.137 Another
necessary protection should guard against abuse by NPEs. Since
some NPEs conduct research and develop patented technologies, albeit
for the purpose of waging patent litigation, there should be an
additional test for eligibility under § 174 that examines the amount of
litigation activity performed by the taxpayer.
Such a test could
require a taxpayer claiming a § 174 deduction for a patent acquisition
to account for his litigation expenditures. Furthermore, his eligibility
would depend on whether his average expenditures in a given period
exceeded a certain threshold. An analog to such a test currently exists
in § 41 R&D tax-credit determinations for qualified research. 138 A test
to weed out NPEs in this scenario would be especially necessary given
the increased opportunity to abuse the capital-gains incentive under
§ 1235.139 A strict statutory definition for NPEs could serve such a
purpose.

3. Renew § 41-R&D Credits for Qualified Research
Expenditures-for Substantially Longer Periods of Time or Make that
Section a Permanent Part of the Code
Congress enacted the research expenditure credit under § 41 in
1981 in order to encourage increased research spending in the United
137.
As soon as a patent is used to generate revenue independent from its use as a
component of R&D, it falls outside the purpose of I.R.C. § 174, which is to promote innovation.
Therefore, the holder of that patent should not be allowed to recover the cost of his acquisition on
an accelerated schedule under § 174 (i.e., immediate deduction or ratable deduction over a period
of at least five years). See I.R.C. § 174(a)-(b) (2006). "Depreciation" or "amortization" allows a
taxpayer to recover the cost of his capital on a schedule based on the theoretical depreciation of
the asset at issue. A deduction of his capital cost against gross income is a method by which a
taxpayer may recover his capital. Under the principles of US tax law, recovery of capital is not
considered "income" and is therefore not taxable. See generally Commr. v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,
211 F.2d 928 (1954) (stating the basic tenet of the recovery of capital doctrine by declaring "[ilf
the property or money paid represents a return of capital or a contribution to capital it is not
subject to income taxation").
138.
The tax credit applies to incremental increases in R&D spending above a base
amount (e.g., the average spending over the last three years). See I.R.C. § 41(a), (c) (2006),
amended by American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 102(c)(1)(B), 126 Stat.
2313, 2326-28 (2013).
139.
Section 1235 categorizes any gain on the sale or other qualified disposition
(including some licenses) of a patent as capital gain. Awards from litigation can be categorized as
royalties, and depending on the type of license that is constructed, may be qualified as capital
gains. Since § 1235 is available only to inventors or persons who acquire an invention from an
inventor, NPEs can take particular advantage of § 1235 if unchecked (most NPEs are
pass-through entities, and the royalties are allocated to individuals behind the entity, in this
case for § 1235 determinations). See I.R.C. § 1235(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(c)(1) (1980).
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States by alleviating some of the risks companies faced when
undertaking research with uncertain rewards. 140 The credit applies
only to a portion of qualified research expenditures above what a
company typically spends, effectively making the credit an incentive
only for increased research activity. 141
Since its inception, however, § 41 has remained a temporary
provision, and Congress has allowed it to expire repeatedly over its life
only to renew it again, sometimes retroactively. In fact, the most
recent session of Congress at the time of this writing, the 112th
Congress, allowed this provision to expire on December 31, 2011, its
fifteenth expiration since 1985.142 There are currently a number of
congressional bills proposing to extend this provision for another year,
but thus far, these bills are still in committee.1 43
Extending this credit for periods longer than one year would be
conducive to the goal of promoting innovation. Such an extension
would provide companies more clarity when crafting their long-term
plans. A longer effective period is also necessary since it may take
some time before any significant increases in R&D spending as a
result of the credit can occur. 14 4 Also, a temporary credit may place
the United States at a competitive disadvantage in the global economy
compared with countries that offer permanent credits. 145
4. Further Shape the Regulations Regarding the Tax Treatment of
Cross-Licensing Agreements to Broadly Favor Information Exchanges
that Foster Innovation
The proper tax treatment of CLAs has been under much
debate. In 2006, the IRS issued a request for comments, information,
and documents on CLAs in order to better understand these
transactions. 14 6 In response to this request, several commentators
stated that companies typically enter into CLAs to provide each party
unfettered use of their respective patents. That is, parties to a CIA
seek the "freedom to operate" or the freedom to use their own IP
without threat of costly patent litigation from potentially competing
140.
See Tax Reform Options: Incentives for Innovation, supra note 108, at 8-9.
141.
Id. at 9.
142.
Id.
143.
See, e.g., H.R. 3476, 112th Cong. (2011) (as referred to H. Subcomm., Jan. 12, 2012);
S. 1866, 112th Cong. (2011) (as referred to S. Comm. on Fin., Nov. 15, 2011).
144.
See Tax Reform Options: Incentives for Innovation: Hearing Before the S. Fin.
Comm., supra note 108 (statement of Dr. Dirk Pilat, Head of the Structural Policy Division,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Directorate for Science, Technology
and Industry).
145.
See id.
146.
I.R.S. Notice 2006-34, 2006-1 C.B. 705.
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patent claims of the other party. 147
Typically, parties to these
arrangements do not value the patents involved beyond a broad
relative judgment reflected in the cash payments made between
contracting parties. 148 Based on this general characterization, the
Internal Revenue Service issued Revenue Procedure 2007-23
describing the proper tax treatment of what it calls a Qualified Patent

Cross Licensing Arrangement (QPCLA). 149 A QPCLA is a CLA that is
nonexclusive, nontransferable, and between uncontrolled parties, the
subject matter of which is limited to the parties' present or future
patent rights, as specified in the arrangement.1 5 0 QPCLAs are taxed
only on the amount of any cash exchanged. 15 1 This Revenue Procedure
is the first step among many required to grant more clarity into the
tax consequences of information-sharing activities of operating
companies.
In fact, in the same Revenue Procedure, the IRS
requested additional information on other types of arrangements, such
as joint IP-development agreements. 152
5. Formally Adopt a Liberal Interpretation of the Law Regarding the
Tax Treatment of Like-Kind Patent Exchanges Under § 1031
Section 1031 grants taxpayers nonrecognition of gains or losses
on like-kind exchanges of properties held for productive use in a trade
or business or for investment. 153 Congress enacted this provision to
facilitate transactions where a taxpayer does not "cash out" of his
economic position.
Cashing out typically occurs in exchanges of
illiquid assets such as real estate. 154
Despite the longevity of both the patent system and the special
treatment of like-kind exchanges, 15 5 there has been relatively little

147.
Rev. Proc. 2007-23, 2007-1 C.B. 675.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
152.
Id.
153.
I.R.C. § 1031(a) (2006).
154.
See Erik M. Jensen, The Uneasy Justification for Special Treatment of Like-Kind
Exchanges, 4 AM. J. TAX POl'Y 193, 199-200 (1985). Jensen explains:
The basic reason for allowing nonrecognition of gain or loss on the exchange of
like-kind property is that the taxpayer's economic situation after the exchange is
fundamentally the same as it was before the transaction occurred . ... The underlying
assumption of section 1031(a) is that the new property is substantially a continuation
of the old investment still unliquidated.
Id. at 199 n.29 (citing Koch v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 54, 63-64 (1978)).
155.
The patent system has its origins in the founding of the nation and like-kind
exchanges have received special treatment since 1921. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; I.R.C.
§ 202(c)(1).
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guidance on the proper treatment of patent exchanges. What little
guidance there is comes from regulations dealing with intangibles in a
general sense and case-by-case interpretations of the rules. 15 6 For
instance, according to Treasury Regulation Section 1.1031(a)-2(c),
whether an exchange of intangibles qualifies for non-recognition under
§ 1031 depends on a two-prong test analyzing the "nature or
character" of the rights inherent in the intangible and the underlying
property itself.15 7 In Technical Advice Memorandum 200602034, the
IRS analogizes to the treatment of depreciable tangible personal
property in deciding that an exchange of patents passes this test
whenever the patents match North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) general asset classes and product classes. 15 8 In this
same memorandum, the IRS explicitly rejected the use of the broad
classification scheme used in US patent law (i.e., process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter), stating that "the tax law with
respect to like-kind exchanges generally mandates specificity and the
analysis of exchanges on an item-by-item basis rather than on a global
basis." 15 9
Ironically, although the IRS sought to narrow the test for
qualified like-kind patent exchanges, it inadvertently created a rather
liberal interpretation of the rules. Patents are, by nature, descriptive
of fundamental technologies that can touch upon several different
classes of products; for example, a patent for an electronic circuit could
touch upon a multitude of consumer products as well as industrial
products. The regulations the IRS has cited state that NAICS product
classes are determined as of the date of the exchange and that a
property listed in more than one product class is treated as listed in
any one of those product classes. Given this guidance, it would appear
that patents can qualify for § 1031 like-kind exchanges with relative
ease-a condition that would facilitate the information exchanges
between operating companies necessary to promote innovation. There

156.
LaVonne D. Lawson, Like-Kind Exchanges of IntangibleAssets under Section 1031,
L.A. CNTY. BAR Ass'N TAxATION SECTION, at 6 (2006), http://www.lacba.org/Files/Main%20Folder/
Sections/Taxation/Files/7.pdf.
157.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2(c)(1) (as amended in 2005).
158.
The IRS included the following explanation in a national office technical advice
memorandum:

Thus, the first prong of the test under § 1.1031(a)-2(c)(1) is satisfied if a patent exists
on both sides of the exchange. In testing whether there is a match of the underlying
property for purposes of satisfying the second prong of the like-kind test set forth in
§ 1.1031(a)-2(c)(1), matching by General Asset Class under § 1.1031(a)-2(b)(2) and the
Product Classes of § 1.1031(a)-2(b)(3) is both reasonable and consistent with the
Income Tax Regulations.
I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200602034 (Jan. 13, 2006).
159.
Id.
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is continued uncertainty, however, because this guidance currently
rests solely on an analogy to a related item in the regulations and on a
single case analysis. Formally adopting this guidance by adding it to
the regulations would remove uncertainty and promote innovation.
B. ForeclosingMisappropriationOpportunitiesfor NPEs
Another important way to ensure that the tax incentives for
innovation in the Code are validly used by innovating companies is to
eliminate any application of these incentives to income derived from
The following recommendations require an operable
litigation.
mechanism for distinguishing NPEs from operating companies.
Congress could borrow such a mechanism from state tax codes
containing provisions that directly target high-technology companies,
for example the tax codes of Hawai'i and DC. 16 0
1. Deny Capital-Gains Treatment for Any Patent-Litigation
Recoveries by NPEs
Congress enacted § 1235 to encourage innovation by allowing
professional inventors and technology investors to treat proceeds from
a qualified disposition of a patent as capital gains. 161 In order to
obtain capital-gains treatment, the transferor must be an individual
(as opposed to a corporation), must transfer an undivided interest in
all substantial rights to an unrelated entity (i.e., an individual, a
partnership, or a corporation), and must make this transfer before
reducing the invention to practice (i.e., before commercializing the
invention). 1 6 2 An undivided interest can be a fraction of each
individual right in the bundle provided by the patent, for example the
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention.
And the Code determines whether all substantial rights have been
160.
For example, the Hawai'i Code provides:
"Qualified high technology business" means a business, employing or owning capital
or property, or maintaining an office, in this State; provided that:
(1) More than fifty per cent of its total business activities are qualified research;
and provided further that the business conducts more than seventy-five per cent
of its qualified research in this State; or
(2) More than seventy-five per cent of its gross income is derived from qualified
research; and provided further that this income is received from:
(A) Products sold from, manufactured in, or produced in this State; or
(B) Services performed in this State.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 235-110.9 (2012); see supra Part II; see also GOVERNMENT OF D.C., supra note
97.
161.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(a) (1980).
Id. § 1.1235-2(c), -2(d)(1)(ii) (including "prior to the actual reduction of the invention
162.
to practice" language).

782

VANDERBILT J. OFENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 15:4:753

transferred by what the transferor retains after the transaction and
not by what he has given up. 1 6 3 For example, an inventor who
transfers all of his rights in an invention to a partnership owned by
individuals of no relation to the inventor may treat his earnings as
capital gains (or losses, if incurred). In this scenario, each partner
receives a fraction of the undivided interests in the patent, which he
may then subsequently transfer again with capital-gains treatment
under § 1235.164 Most importantly for NPEs, according to the
regulations, earnings from settlements or damages from patent
disputes may also qualify as capital gains under § 1235 so long as a
party transfers all substantial rights. 165
The tax incentive § 1235 provides is potentially an unintended
boon to the NPE industry since many NPEs are small non-operating
partnerships or limited liability companies consisting mainly of a
handful of individual investors or lawyers. 166
By structuring
settlements in patent disputes properly, such NPEs could enjoy
capital-gains treatment under § 1235 for their recoveries.16 7 The same
treatment could also be applicable to gains from court judgments 16 8
but only as applied to compensatory damages for economic losses. 169
Given that Congress did not intend to enact § 1235 in order to
incentivize litigation, a test to disqualify NPEs from claiming this
incentive would be prudent. A simple statutory exclusion or qualifier
may suffice-one that explicitly limits § 1235 capital gains to
QHTBs. 170
2. Deny § 186 Deductions for Any Patent-Litigation Recoveries by
NPEs
In a similar vein, Congress should also narrowly tailor the tax
benefit under § 186 to exclude NPEs. Congress added § 186 to the
Code in 1969 to reduce or eliminate the tax on compensatory damages

163.
See id. § 1.1235-2(d)(1)(ii).
164.
Id. § 1.1235-2(d)(2).
165.
Id. § 1.1235-1(c)(1).
166.
See Blumberg & Sydell, supra note 36.
167.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(c), -2(d)(1)(ii) (including "prior to the actual reduction of
the invention to practice" language).
168.
See Longino Estate v. Comm'r, 32 T.C. 904 (1959) (considering a settlement); Levens
v. Comm'r, 10 T.C.M. 1083 (1951) (considering an arbitration award); see generally Robert W.
Wood, More Thoughts on Taxation of Commercial Litigation Income, 84 TAX NOTES 1100 (1999)
(discussing issues in the tax treatment of commercial litigation recoveries).
Treas. Reg. § 1.186-1(c)(1) (1972).
169.
170.
Hawai'i exempts patent royalties from state income taxes only for individuals or
QHTC and only for those patents developed and arising out of business. HAW. REV. STAT. § 2357.3 (2012).
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in antitrust, breach of contract, and patent-infringement recoveries. 17 1
Under § 186, a taxpayer is allowed to deduct an amount from ordinary
income, subject to certain qualifications, that is equal to the
compensatory damage amount or unrecovered loss amount, if during
the years of the violation the taxpayer had net operating losses
greater than or equal to those loss amounts. 172 The purpose of
enacting § 186 was to ensure that compensatory damages would be
taxable only when the lost profits for which they compensate would
have been taxable. 173
NPEs can abuse this deduction under § 186 rather easily by
claiming an unrecovered loss on the allegedly lost royalties, regardless
of the validity of the patent from which these royalties would have
derived. In 1969, NPE activity was nonexistent, and Congress did not
intend for § 186 to subsidize a patent-litigation industry as § 186
likely does currently.
Removing NPEs from qualifying for this
deduction would better suit Congress's original intent for this section.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current ecosystem of innovation requires an adjustment to
the existing tax laws governing and incentivizing the development,
exchange, and productive use of technological IP.
Operating
companies today face many potentially crippling challenges to
innovation due to the ever-present threat of patent holdup. For
instance, the modern process of technological innovation requires
input from a multitude of patented technologies, and it is uncommon
for any one company to own or otherwise have rights to every
necessary patent.
This problem is further exacerbated by the
opportunistic behavior of NPEs. Although the Code should not be the
primary mechanism by which to promote innovation, there are
existing provisions within the Code that Congress can adjust in order
to better incentivize IP creation and exchange, and to foreclose
opportunities by NPEs to misappropriate the tax benefits therein.
One way of accomplishing this change is to incorporate a clear
distinction between operating companies and NPEs into the Code.
Some jurisdictions have already adopted such a strategy in their local
tax laws. Given the increasingly challenging environment in which
individuals and companies achieve innovation in the modern IP

171.
62 CORNELL
172.
173.

Edward Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax and Non-Tax Policy Considerations,
L. REV. 701, 724-25 (1977).
Treas. Reg. § 1.186-1(a) (1972).
See Yorio, supra note 171.
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ecosystem, it may be prudent to consider doing the same at the federal
level.

